What was urgent fury

The co-pilot fought the helicopter to the flight deck, but couldn't shut the engines down. On his command, a water hose was rushed to the helicopter where a stream of water was directed into the engine's intakes. The rotor blades stopped and two aircrewmen aboard the Blackhawk scrambled out, beaming with relief. Hospital corpsmen helped the wounded pilot onto a stretcher. By noon it was obvious to the sailors on Guam that the Army, landing at Point Salines, had encountered the heaviest resistance.

All the medevacs up to that point had been Army soldiers. At the end of the operation, 18 American men had died and were wound ed. Other statistics illustrating the intensity of Urgent Fury were recorded on Guam's flight deck: 1, launchings and landings; , gallons of aircraft fuel consumed; , pounds of car go lifted; and 13, pounds of mail delivered.

Urgent Fury had lived up to its name. But it was only the first stage of what was to become a long deployment. On Jan. The opposing forces were neutralized. The situation stabilized with no additional Cuban intervention. And, most importantly, a lawful, democratic government has been restored.

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Chapter II. The Marines landed by amphibious assault vehicle and helicopter on the night of 25 October. By the next day, St. Significant scattered resistance went on for two more days, and some isolated sniping continued until 2 November. During the eight-day campaign, US and 80 foreign students were evacuated without injury. Civil order was restored. Cuban, Soviet and various Eastern bloc representatives were removed from the island.

The casualty toll was relatively light. Eighteen US troops were killed in combat, one died of wounds, were wounded and 28 suffered nonhostile injuries. The Cubans lost 24 killed, 59 wounded and captured who were later returned to Cuba. There were 24 Grenadian civilians killed during the operation. Admiral Wesley L. The Grenada operation attracted the attention of five prominent members of the US military reform community.

In three separate analyses, various aspects of Operation Urgent Fury were considered, and some rather serious complaints were presented. The accounts accepted the basic strategy set by President Ronald Reagan but noted significant faults in the execution of that strategy.

Each report concentrated on slightly different subjects but, in general, all three provide harsh assessments of US operational plans and execution. The first critique was presented at a Washington, D. The fivepage report was prepared by legislative assistant and historian William S.

A second review of the Grenada operation appeared in a copyrighted story in The Boston Globe on 22 October Savage, US Army, Retired. These officers had written the controversial book Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army. No verifiable documentation was included in the article; the authors stated that security strictures prevented a full disclosure of the sources. The third and most authoritative consideration of the US military performance in Grenada was copyrighted in but did not receive general attention until spring He cited the US actions in Grenada, along with other examples of allegedly faulty US defense planning and execution.

Luttwak listed the sources for his Grenada information as two articles from the May issue of the US Naval Institute Proceedings and news reports from October and November issues of various news publications.

I do not question the patriotism, sincerity or conviction of these men. Their accounts are all built around kernels of truth. Unfortunately, each of the treatises contains errors of fact, hasty generalizations and conclusions based on shaky premises. Each of these operational components in Grenada received criticism. It was said that too many forces were employed, the forces were deployed piecemeal against peripheral objectives and the operation was inefficiently directed.

Lind observed:. Luttwak also thought the United States used too much force. Gabriel and Savage stated that there were few enemy units and that the original US assault units were unable to cope with them. By Edward H. Lundquist - February 24, Department of Defense photo by Master Sgt. David Goldie. It has been nearly 40 years since Operation Urgent Fury, one of the biggest military operations in the Western Hemisphere took place in one of its smallest countries.

The ensuing U. The Black Hawk made its combat debut during Urgent Fury. It called for ensuring the safety of American citizens, restoring democratic government on Grenada and preventing Cuban intervention, and it authorized a full-scale, joint-forces invasion conducted with the participation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. Such a mission appeared to require, by law, the consent of Congress. But since a hostage rescue demands complete surprise, the Reagan administration had a handy excuse for skirting the War Powers Act and keeping Congress in the dark until the operation was under way.

The U. Since the invasion was precisely the kind of mission for which special operations forces trained, JSOC played a leading role from the start. Major General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. Doing so meant overcoming such obstacles as the lack of military maps or on-site intelligence and the fact that none of the units involved had previously planned or trained together. The final outline called for the invasion to commence at 2 a. TF would take the southern end of the island, with the Rangers parachuting onto and securing the Point Salines airfield, then moving on the Calivigny barracks and True Blue campus of the medical school.

All of these objectives—including the safe release of the medical students and Commonwealth Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon—were scheduled for completion within four hours of the initial assault, at which point the 82nd would land at Salines and restore law and order.

If all went as planned, the Americans would then hand over peacekeeping duties to a Caribbean force and head for home. The mission was plagued with mishaps. On hitting the water, four SEALs drowned.

The remaining men piled into one boat, but were forced to kill its engine when a Grenadian patrol craft approached. The engine failed to restart and the SEALs had to wait for rescue by a surface vessel. The operation was only two hours old, and already the first force deployed had failed in its mission and suffered 25 percent casualties it was later revealed the SEALs had never trained for the mission they were assigned that night.

Unwilling to postpone the invasion, Metcalf decided to resend the SEALs the next night and move the Ranger drop to just before daybreak, though it would cost them the cover of darkness.

Once again, however, the SEAL team failed to make it ashore. Unable to wait for the SEALs to get through, at 5 a. Within two hours they had overrun all of their objectives. Things did not go as smoothly for the Army. Newly obtained aerial photos showed obstacles on the airfield—something the SEALs might have cleared had they landed.

Such a low-level jump made reserve parachutes useless, so they were discarded. Worse, only the first assault company had expected to jump, so only they were wearing parachutes.

At the last moment the rest of the Rangers scrambled to get into their harnesses, a task made infinitely more difficult when attempted in an aircraft crowded with men and equipment.

As a result, the Rangers began landing more than 30 minutes behind schedule, and the successive drop waves took 90 minutes to complete —in daylight and initially under heavy enemy fire.

So far, Urgent Fury was a perfect example of how not to conduct an airborne operation and was shaping up to be an unmitigated disaster. The first-pass jumpers had scattered the length of the airfield and were just starting to regroup when two armored vehicles rolled onto the tarmac.

The enemy troops fired at the Rangers on the ground before turning their attention to the vulnerable second-pass jumpers. Within 10 minutes the guns fell silent. By sheer luck and despite all the mishaps, the Rangers had lost only one man. They soon cleared the airfield, opening it for the 82nd Airborne to begin landing troops and equipment.

Grenadian forces mounted a late-afternoon counterattack with three armored vehicles, but defenders with antitank weapons and an orbiting AC gunship stopped them cold. Still, both the Rangers and the 82nd troopers met surprisingly stiff resistance, prompting ground forces commander Maj.