Socrates why be just

The first is the "second one" he mentions Republic IX. He argues that there is pleasure for each part of the soul and that the praise of the lover of wisdom shows that that the life of reason is the "sweetest" Republic IX.

A few lines later, perhaps because this second proof might seem less than decisive, Socrates gives another proof that the just life is more pleasurable. He describes this proof as the "greatest and most decisive overthrow" for the just man against the unjust man Republic IX.

In this proof, Socrates argues that a part of the soul get its "truest" pleasures when the objects of its desires are "most proper" to it, that when reason rules in the soul as is the case in a just human being , all three parts get their "truest" pleasures because the knowledge in the part with reason directs action, and that when the appetitive or spirited part rules, the three parts do not get their "truest" pleasures.

The soul, in this case, is living a life that is not its own. So in both ways the just life is better than the unjust life. Most true, Socrates" Republic X. It can seem that justice in the city is not better for the rulers in a just city. This can suggest that justice in the just city is a burden to the rulers because they would spend more time in contemplation and thus would be happier if they were sometimes to forsake their duty to rule and thus were to act contrary to the rules of justice in a just city.

He asks Socrates whether the requirement to rule is wrong because it takes the lover of wisdom away from the intellectual activity that characterizes the good life. For we will say to them that when men of similar quality who spring up in other cities, they are justified not sharing in the labors there.

But you we have engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city to be, as it were, king-bees and leaders in the hive. You have received a better and more complete education than the others, and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life.

Down you must go then, each in his turn, [to rule the others]. Will they disobey us when we tell them this, and will they refuse to share in the labors of state each in his turn while permitted to dwell the most of the time with one another in that purer world [of contemplation]? Impossible, for we shall be imposing just commands on men who are just, but each of them will surely go to rule as something that must be done" Republic VII.

Socrates says that for lovers of wisdom who have received their education in a just city, the requirement for them to rule is not wrong. They owe the city for their education, and if the ruling is an imposition, it is offset by the good it brings to the city.

This, Socrates explains, is something the lovers of wisdom in a just city will themselves think is true. They will think that this is true because the education in a rightly founded city makes them and the citizens more generally, to the extent this is possible for these citizens, think they should to endorse and to comply with the organization in the city. It makes them see that organization achieves the purpose for which they organize themselves into a city.

This leaves the question whether ruling is an imposition and whether the lovers of wisdom would have more time for contemplation if the were to forsake their duty to rule. There is a strong temptation to think it is an imposition, but since the just city is arranged to support the rulers, it might be that if one of them were sometimes to forsake his duty to rule, the support in the city for rulers would break down because the organization in the city would break down.

So it might be that by forsaking his duty to rule, a ruler would make his life worse because he would be arranging things so that he spends less time in contemplation. They thought that it was crucial not only for a good life, but also for an understanding of how to live well, to have an adequate general understanding for the world.

Moreover, though they granted that it was a function of reason to determine the way we live, they, each in their own way, did not think that this was the sole function of reason [as Socrates had thought].

Plato rather seems to have thought that guiding us through our embodied life is a function which reason takes on, but that it, left to itself, is concerned to theoretically understand things quite generally" Michael Frede, "Introduction," Rationality in Greek Thought , It thus has two lives and two sets of concerns. Its own concern is to live a life of contemplation of truth. But, joined to the body, it also has to concern itself with the needs of the body.

In doing this it easily forgets itself and its own needs, it easily gets confused so as to make the needs of the body its own. To know how to live well is to know how to live in such a way that the soul is free again to clearly see and mind its own business, namely to contemplate the truth. Thus we have an extremely complex inversion of the relative weight of one's theoretical understanding of reality and one's practical knowledge of how to live.

It is one's understanding of reality, and the position of the soul in it, that saves the soul by restoring it to the extent that this is possible in this life to its natural state, in which it contemplates the truth. Philosophers form the only class of men to possess knowledge and are also the most just men. Their souls, more than others, aim to fulfil the desires of the rational part. After comparing the philosopher king to the most unjust type of man—represented by the tyrant, who is ruled entirely by his non-rational appetites—Plato claims that justice is worthwhile for its own sake.

In Book IX he presents three arguments for the conclusion that it is desirable to be just. Next he argues that, though each of the three main character types—money-loving, honor-loving, and truth-loving—have their own conceptions of pleasure and of the corresponding good life—each choosing his own life as the most pleasant—only the philosopher can judge because only he has experienced all three types of pleasure. He tries to demonstrate that only philosophical pleasure is really pleasure at all; all other pleasure is nothing more than cessation of pain.

One might notice that none of these arguments actually prove that justice is desirable apart from its consequences—instead, they establish that justice is always accompanied by true pleasure. In all probability, none of these is actually supposed to serve as the main reason why justice is desirable. Instead, the desirability of justice is likely connected to the intimate relationship between the just life and the Forms. Justice is good, in other words, because it is connected to the greatest good, the Form of the Good.

Plato ends The Republic on a surprising note. Having defined justice and established it as the greatest good, he banishes poets from his city. Poets, he claims, appeal to the basest part of the soul by imitating unjust inclinations. By encouraging us to indulge ignoble emotions in sympathy with the characters we hear about, poetry encourages us to indulge these emotions in life. Poetry, in sum, makes us unjust.

In closing, Plato relates the myth of Er, which describes the trajectory of a soul after death. Just souls are rewarded for one thousand years, while unjust ones are punished for the same amount of time. Each soul then must choose its next life. SparkTeach Teacher's Handbook. Important Quotes Explained.

Socrates ends the discussion by prompting Glaucon and the others to do well both in this life and in the afterlife c-d. The Republic has acquired the recognition of a classic and seminal work in political philosophy.

It is often taught in courses that focus on political theory or political philosophy. Moreover, in the dialogue Socrates seems primarily concerned with what is an ethical issue, namely whether the just life is better than the unjust life for the individual. These two observations raise two issues.

The first is whether the Republic is primarily about ethics or about politics. If it is primarily about ethics then perhaps its recognition as a seminal political work is unwarranted. Moreover, considering it a political work would be somewhat mistaken. The second issue is that even if thinking of it as a classic in political philosophy is warranted, it is very difficult to situate it in terms of its political position. Interpreters of the Republic have presented various arguments concerning the issue of whether the dialogue is primarily about ethics or about politics.

In Book II, he proposes to construct the just city in speech in order to find justice in it and then to proceed to find justice in the individual a. Thus, he seems to use a discussion in political matters as a means by which to answer what is essentially an ethical question.

But, Socrates also spends a lot of time in the dialogue on political matters in relation to the question of political justice such as education, the positions and relations among political classes, war, property, the causes of political strife and change of regimes, and several other matters.

Each of these could provide important contributions to political philosophy. Another relevant consideration is that there are several indications in the dialogue that the aim in the discussion is more pressing than the means the just city. Thus, the argument goes, Socrates does not seem primarily interested in discussing political philosophy but ethics instead.

Another related argument indicates that the discussion entails great doubts about whether the just city is even possible. Socrates claims this along with the idea that the function of the just city in the argument is to enable the individual to get a better idea of justice and injustice b-d, a-b. Thus, it is very difficult for us to conclude that Socrates takes the political discussion as seriously as he does the moral question see Annas, Julia.

Platonic Ethics, Old and New. Other interpreters indicate that the Republic is essentially about both ethics and politics among others see Santas, Gerasimos. Plato: Political Philosophy ; Reeve C. Philosopher Kings. Thus, these social reforms seem to be developed for their own sake. In Book VIII he criticizes democracy as an unjust regime and thus he seems to launch a critique against Athenian democracy.

He also adopts several measures in the just city, which were part of the Spartan constitution. Like Spartan citizens, the guardians of the just city are professional soldiers whose aim is the protection of the city, the guardians eat together, and they have their needs provided for by other classes.

But unlike Sparta, the just city has philosophers as rulers, a rigorous system of education in intellectual matters, and it is not timocratic or honor loving. Thus, the argument suggests, in addition to the main ethical question the dialogue is also about political philosophy. Another position is that even though the discussion of political matters is instrumental to addressing the main ethical question of the dialogue, Socrates makes several important contributions to political philosophy.

One such contribution is his description of political regimes in Book VIII and his classification of them on a scale of more or less just. Another such contribution is his consideration of the causes of political change from one political regime to another.

Moreover, Socrates seems to raise and address a number of questions that seem necessary in order to understand political life clearly. Thus, according to this view, it is warranted to regard the Republic as a work on political philosophy and as a seminal work in that area. A further relevant consideration has to do with how one understands the nature of ethics and political philosophy and their relation.

Since modernity, it becomes much easier to treat these as separate subjects. Modern ethics is more focused on determining whether an action is morally permissible or not whereas ancient ethics is more focused on happiness or the good life.

Thus, ethics and political philosophy are more closely linked for ancient thinkers than they may be for us since modernity. Ethics and political philosophy seem to be different sides of the same coin. There are several competing candidates. The Republic entails elements of socialism as when Socrates expresses the desire to achieve happiness for the whole city not for any particular group of it b and when he argues against inequalities in wealth d.

There are also elements of fascism or totalitarianism. Several commentators focused on these elements to dismiss the Republic as a proto-totalitarian text see Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies. There are also some strong elements of communism such as the idea that the guardian class ought to possess things in common. Socrates seems to argue against allowing much freedom to individuals and to criticize the democratic tendency to treat humans as equals.

Some have argued that the Republic is neither a precursor of these political positions nor does it fit any of them. They find that the Republic has been such a seminal work in the history of political philosophy precisely because it raises such issues as its political stance while discussing many of the features of such political positions. The analogy of the city and the soul, is Socrates proposed and accepted method by which to argue that the just person is better off than the unjust person Book II, ca.

If Socrates is able to show how a just city is always happier than unjust cities, then he can have a model by which to argue that a just person is always happier than an unjust one.

He plausibly assumes that there is an interesting, intelligible, and non-accidental relation between the structural features and values of a city and an individual. But commentators have found this curious approach one of the most puzzling features of the Republic. Moreover, there is much controversy concerning its usefulness in the attempt to discover and to defend justice in terms of the individual. In several passages Socrates seems to say that the same account of justice must apply to both cities justice is the right order of classes and to individuals justice is the right order of the soul.

But even though he says this he seems to think that this ought to be the case for different reasons. For example, at a , he seems to say that the same account of justice ought to apply to the city and to the individual since the same account of any predicate X must apply to all things that are X. So, if a city or an individual is just then the same predicates must apply to both. In other passages Socrates seems to mean that same account of justice ought to apply to the city and to the individual since the X-ness of the whole is due to the X-ness of the parts d.

So, if the people in the city are just, then this will cause the city to be just as well. In other passages still, he seems to claim that the justice of the city can be used as a heuristic device by which to look for justice in the individual, thus the relation between the two seems quite loose ea.

Thus, one of the most pressing issues regarding the Republic is whether Socrates defends justice successfully or not. Sachs argues that Socrates commits the fallacy of irrelevance. Sachs observes that what Socrates defends is psychic health or rationality which may lead one to be happy but he fails to defend justice. Socrates fails to show why having a balanced soul will lead one to act justly or why psychic health amounts to justice. Thus, Plato presents Socrates defending psychic health rather than justice.

Otherwise, the problem of being psychically just but socially unjust remains. Socrates indicates the difficulty and extreme effort required to attain knowledge of the forms and the form of the Good, thus the just person will pursue learning and not spend time indulging in the satisfaction of desires that typically lead to unjust actions. This approach of bridging the gap between a just soul and just actions may have some drawbacks. One drawback may be that several unjust actions may be motivated by desires that are compatible with the desire for knowledge.

The proponents of this approach argue that the philosopher agrees to rule since his knowledge of the good directly motivates him to act against his interests and to do something that is good objectively and for others.

Thus, the philosopher regards ruling as something in his interest despite the fact that it interferes with his pursuit of knowledge, since in ruling he will be imitating the forms. Singpurwalla points out that only very few people can acquire such knowledge of the forms so as to be just persons, thus for most people Socrates offers no good reason to be just. Singpurwalla suggests a fourth approach which can defend Socrates contra Sachs and which will avoid the criticisms launched against the other approaches.

Antonis Coumoundouros Email: acoumoundouros adrian. Synopsis of the Republic a. Book II Glaucon is not persuaded by the arguments in the previous discussion a. Book IV Adeimantus complains that the guardians in the just city will not be very happy a. Book V Socrates is about to embark on a discussion of the unjust political regimes and the corresponding unjust individuals when he is interrupted by Adeimantus and Polemarchus a-b. Book VI Socrates goes on to explain why philosophers should rule the city.

Book VII Socrates continues his discussion of the philosopher and the Forms with a third analogy, the analogy of the cave ac. Book IX Socrates is now ready to discuss the tyrannical individual a.

Book X Thereafter, Socrates returns to the subject of poetry and claims that the measures introduced to exclude imitative poetry from the just city seem clearly justified now a. Ethics or Political Philosophy? The Analogy of the City and the Soul The analogy of the city and the soul, is Socrates proposed and accepted method by which to argue that the just person is better off than the unjust person Book II, ca. References and Further Reading a. Standard Greek Text Slings, S.

English Translations Shorey, Paul. Republic 2 vols. Loeb, This translation includes an introduction and notes. Bloom, Allan. The Republic of Plato.

New York: Basic Books, This translation includes notes and an interpretative essay. Ferrari, G. The Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, This translation includes an introduction. Reeve, C. Indianapolis: Hackett, General Discussions of the Republic all attempt to provide a unified interpretation of the dialogue.

Murphy, N. Cross, R. White, Nicholas P. Annas, Julia. Howland, Jacob. Rosen, Stanley. Santas, Gerasimos. Irwin, T. Monoson, Sara.